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NIGERIA: ALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES WITH ACCOUNTABILTY 
 
Dr. A.B. Ahmed* & Muhammad Bello** 
Abstract 
Despite the damaging impacts of the crash in the Nigerian capital markets between 2007 
and 2011 on the economy and the established cases of regulatory failures in the industry, 
the question of regulatory accountability has not received much attention in Nigeria. 
Looking back at these regulatory failures vis-à-vis the statutory responsibilities of the 
regulators of the capital markets in Nigeria and comparing same with the securities 
regulatory authority of the UK under the FSMA, 2000 this article argued that 
responsibilities should go with accountability for an effective capital market regulation in 
Nigeria. The article found that the apex regulator in Nigeria lacks the necessary 
operational independence. It questioned the increasing trend of regulatory laxity and 
‘highhandedness’ in the capital market. The article recommended a proper regulatory 
accountability through a review of administrative decisions, actions in torts on the grounds 
of regulatory negligence, breach of statutory duty and misfeasance in public office. It also 
recommended a total restructuring of the apex regulator to make it more operationally 
independent in line with global best practices. 
 
1. Introduction 
One remarkable invention of our time is the capital market.1 The capital market has become an increasingly 
dominant wealth creation platform upon which most modern economies rely. The significance of this market is 
reinforced by the forces of economic globalization manifested partly through increased integration and 
‘denationalization’ of securities markets around the world.2 A slight dysfunction in one capital market could 
send enormous shock waves to many other markets elsewhere.3 In the same vein, a critical regulatory failure in 
one market could destabilize economies around the world and can trigger serious financial crisis. This is how 
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1See Garner, ed. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edn, at p. 982. It is a market in which securities are traded. 
Securities here mean shares or stocks, bonds and debentures. Section 315 of the ISA, 2007 defines  "securities" 
to mean:(a) debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government; (b) debentures, stocks, 
shares, bonds or notes issued or proposed to be issued by a body corporate; (c) any right or option in respect of 
any such debentures, stocks, shares, bonds or notes; or (d) commodities futures, contracts, options and other 
derivatives, and the term securities in this Act includes those securities in the category of the securities listed in 
(a) - (d) above which may be transferred by means of any electronic mode approved by the Commission and 
which may be deposited, kept or stored with any licensed.   
2
 See  Stultz, R.M., ‘Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial 
Globalization’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 47, No. 2, Regulation of Securities Markets: Perspectives 
from Accounting, Law, and Financial Economies (May, 2009), pp. 349-390, 
DOI:10.1111/j.l475679X.200900327.x ; Deléchat, C, et al, ‘How Global Financial Markets Affect Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2010), pp. 172-208; Stuber, W., International Securities and Capital 
Markets,  The International Lawyer, Vol. 43, No. 2, International Legal Developments in Review: 2008 
(Summer 2009), pp. 613-639; Simmons, B.A., The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital 
Market Regulation’, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 589-620; Sen, S., Swings 
and Paradoxes in International Capital Markets: a Theoretical Note, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, 
No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 179-198; Ikhide, S.I., ‘Financial Liberalisation and the Growth of the Capital Market in 
Nigeria’, African Review of Money Finance and Banking, No. 1/2 (1997), pp. 5-37;  
3
 See Bekaert, et al., ‘Global Crises and Equity Market Contagion’, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 
17121 http://www.nber.org/papers/w17121; Schwert, G.W.,  ‘Stock Volatility During the Recent Financial 
Crisis’, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 16976, (April, 2011) http://www.nber.org/papers/w16976; 
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critical and indispensable the capital market has become in our predominantly market economies. In his century 
old article on the Stock Exchange, Huebner described this platform as ‘the pulse of our economic life’1 while 
Duguid described it as ‘the nerve center of the politics and finances of nations’ as well as ‘the barometer of their 
prosperity and adversity.’2 However, the centrality of the capital market to modern economies presents enormous 
challenges. It is a vulnerable platform in which the instinctive greed of human beings could easily unleash itself 
and this may extend the stretch of regulatory jurisdictions; hence the ‘speculative fervor’, ‘irrational exuberance’ 
and bubbles3 have become the recurring phenomena in many of these markets around the world.4 This prompted 
the need for a strict regulatory surveillance or oversight in order to protect investors and market operators from 
the general human mischief.5 In other words, the law and its enforcement are necessary for the maintenance of 
an effective and efficient capital market. But the law is not simply a question of assigning regulatory 
responsibilities simplicita; it is about both responsibility and accountability. 
Holding regulators to account for gross regulatory failures has not received much attention in Nigeria. History 
has shown that the ‘speculative fervor’ conditioned by regulatory laxity and ‘highhandedness’ became one of the 
principal causes of the near collapse of the Nigerian capital market in 2010.6  For instance, the House of 
Representatives’ Ad hoc Committee (the Ad hoc Committee) which investigated the near collapse of the 
Nigerian capital market following the 2007-2011 crisis revealed that regulatory failure was one of the key factors 
responsible for the crisis in the capital market noting that ‘the capital market and its institutions have been (sic) a 
den and haven for corrupt practices which have resulted in very low investors’ confidence’.7 In the same vein, it 
was observed that ‘ineffective market regulation and supervision, weak institution and lack of corporate 
governance, lack of regulatory pro-activity and cohesion, inefficiency and cumbersome processes’ have become 
the bane of the Nigerian capital market.8 Since the 2004-2005 consolidation exercise in the banking sector, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) and the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) have become terribly uncoordinated and entangled 
                                                          
1
 Huebner, S.S., ‘Scope and Functions of the Stock Market’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 35, No. 3, Stocks and the Stock Market (May, 1910), pp. 1-23 
2
 Quoted in Huebner ibid. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a former Brazilian President, reportedly remarked “you 
can neither have economic growth nor economic development, without having solid capital market”. 
3
 See Kaplan, P.D., et al., ‘The History and Economics of Stock Market Crashes’, Insights into the Global 
Financial Crisis, p.132.  
4 See Beatie, A., ‘Market Crashes: The South Sea Bubble’, 
http://www.investopedia.com/features/crashes/crashes3.asp (accessed 13/7/15) 
5
 See for instance, the UK’s South Sea Bubble Act, 1720. Some scholars are critical of stringent regulatory 
regime for the capital market. See for instance Ghosh, D.N.,  ‘Quirks of the Market Regulator’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 16 (Apr. 17-23, 2004), pp. 1550-1551, arguing that ‘No biometric database, 
howsoever comprehensive or intrusive, can deter those who are innovative, daring and determined to find ways 
of escaping out of the regulatory net… Markets can develop on the basis of mutual respect between the regulator 
and market participants; this can build up only in an ambience of trust and confidence. Trust is the solvent of the 
market process, but when we trust, we know that we could be disappointed. Plants do not flourish when one 
pulls them up too often to see whether their roots are growing or not. Institutional and professional roots for 
market development cannot flourish if we constantly uproot it to satisfy ourselves that everything is indeed 
transparent and trustworthy.’ 
6
 The initial response to the global financial crisis by the Nigerian Regulators was to insist that Nigeria was 
‘insulated’ from the crisis. See Soludo, C.C., Global Financial and Economic Crisis: How Vulnerable is Nigeria? 
CBN, Abuja, (January 2009), at p. 24.  
7
  See the House of Representative Ad hoc Committee Investigating the Near Collapse of the Nigerian Capital 
Market, Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Investigation into the Near Collapse of the Nigerian Capital 
Market, National Assembly, Abuja; Resolution No (HR70/2012) (hereafter ‘House of Representative Ad hoc 
Committee, ‘Report.’). In the United States, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission also concluded that ‘the 
crisis was avoidable: the captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial system ignored warnings 
and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving risks within a system essential to the well-being of the 
American public.’ See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, xvii (2011), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.  
8
 See Dialoke, O., Capital Market Crisis: Why a Slump Became a Crash, Vanguard, 16th Januarys, 2011; 
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in a free-for-all regulatory atmosphere while market infractions and insider dealings were increasingly ignored 
and condoned. Some of the regulators were found to be direct accomplices to market infractions, insider abuses 
and other illegal dealings.1 There is a general consensus among stakeholders and scholars that the Nigerian 
capital market and the economy suffered tremendously from these avoidable regulatory failures and confusions.2 
In particular, the crash in the value of stocks in the capital market between 2007and 2011 and the total chaos in 
the market have negatively affected the country’s financial stability and economic growth.3 However, in spite of 
these devastating impacts little has been done to identify the ‘regulatory cracks,’ clarify the responsibilities and 
accountability of all stakeholders under the law in order to forestall or minimize the impacts of future 
occurrences.4 The accountability of the regulators seems largely ignored in spite of the inexcusable actions and 
inactions that grossly violated legal prescriptions and undermined both the capital market and the entire financial 
system. The reality is that crisis in the capital market is a recurring phenomenon the world over and it is not here 
suggested that it can be averted completely but it certainly makes sense to recognize this reality while addressing 
observed lapses in its operation and regulation. 
In the light of the above, this article examines the legally prescribed responsibilities of the key regulators in the 
capital market and advocates for effective accountability measures to address any irresponsible behavior by any 
regulator. Guided by the history of capital market crises and the available evidence on the recent 2007-2011 
crisis in the capital market in Nigeria, the article identifies and critically examines the relevant statutory 
responsibilities of the regulators of the capital market in Nigeria in order to clarify the increasing lack of 
regulatory coordination among them. The article argues that ‘regulatory passivity’ and ‘regulatory 
highhandedness’ ought to be penalized rather than praised. It also argues that holding regulators to account is 
important to the stability of the market and is likely to deepen investors’ confidence in the market. The article 
seeks to accomplish these tasks by first discussing the functions of a capital market. Section three examines the 
statutory responsibilities of these regulators and mirrors the functions of each against the backdrop of the 2007-
2011 capital market crash. Section four examines issues of accountability which are often ignored in the 
financial services sector in Nigeria. It also looks inward to identify the needed accountability principles from 
both public and private law perspectives and then proposed a restructuring of the apex regulator to ensure 
regulatory accountability. Section five concludes the article with some recommendations.  
2. Nature, Functions and Significance of the Capital Market 
The capital market is a ‘securities market in which stocks and bonds with long term maturities are traded’.5 
Country's capital markets are the markets in which companies, governments and their institutions raise capital 
publicly and ‘where securities representing claims to capital are traded’.6 The market consists of the securities 
and non-securities segments. 7  While the latter consists of banks and other financial institutions with their 
instruments such as loans, mortgages and leases, the former which is the focus of this article consists of both the 
fixed interest securities (debentures and bonds) and the shares markets. 8  In Nigeria, the bonds market is 
                                                          
1
 ISA defines "insider dealing" to include insider trading which occurs ‘when a person or group of persons who 
being in possession of some confidential and price sensitive information not generally available to the public, 
utilizes such information to buy or sell securities for the benefit of himself, itself or any person’. See section 315. 
2
 See Jenrola O.A., & Daisola, O.R., Ujunwa, A., et al., The Global Financial Crisis: Realities and Implications 
for the Nigerian Capital Market, Am. J. Soc. Mgmt. Sci., 2011, 2(3): 341-347, 
doi:10.5251/ajsms.2011.2.3.341.347; Yakubu A. & Akerele A.O.,  An Analysis of the Impact of Global 
Financial Crisis on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, Current Research Journal of Social Sciences 4(6): 396-399, 
2012 ; The Implications of Global Financial Crisis on the Nigerian Capital Market Performance: An Empirical 
Investigation (2000-2008), European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol. 16, No.1, 2012. 
3
 Nwude, C.E., the Crash of the Nigerian Stock Market: What Went Wrong, the Consequences and the Panacea, 
Developing Country Studies, Vol 2, No.9, 105 (2012). 
4
 Some company executives were already prosecuted and sentenced for insider dealings, abuse of powers and a 
host of other violations of the securities and criminal laws in the country. See  
5
 Garner, ed. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edn.  
6
 Stultz, R.M., ‘Securities Laws’, op cit, at p. 350. 
7
 See Ikhide, S.I., ‘Financial Liberalization’, op cit, at pp. 5-6.  
8
 Ibid, at p. 6. 
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dominated by governments1 while the shares market is dominated by private enterprises. In terms of institutional 
arrangement, the capital market consists of a primary market which is dominated by the brokers, dealers and 
ventures capitalists and a secondary market dominated by the Stock Exchange. The former's main concern is 
with the primary issues, while the secondary market handles already existing issues of the Exchange.2 The ISA, 
2007 defines the latter as ‘any exchange registered by the Commission…which constitutes, maintains or 
provides a market place for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing 
with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by an exchange.’3  
The Nigerian banking sector consolidation exercise of 2004-2005 had demonstrated the immense potentials and 
significance of the capital market as an efficient, reliable and effective vehicle for capital mobilization and 
allocation in modern emerging economies. The function of the primary market in mobilizing and channeling 
savings into long term investments and infrastructural development constitutes the most crucial advantage of the 
market as it offers diverse options to investors and financiers.4 It directs the flow of capital from channels least 
needed at a given time to channels in need at the same time. The liquidity and flexibility offered by the 
secondary market further strengthen the capital market as a convenient platform where investments could be 
disposed off without much difficulty. Through this role of mobilizing and channeling funds, the capital market 
enables wider investor participation in economic activities, encourages financial discipline, transparency and 
accountability, promotes solvency and corporate competitiveness, and reduces over-reliance on debt financing5 
with its characteristic challenges of enforcement in the country.6 Secondly, the market informs and guides 
investment decisions as it is the barometer of determining the profitability of certain class of businesses thereby 
preventing the misdirection of investments into unnecessary, unprofitable ventures.7 In particular, the stock 
exchange has been rightly described as ‘the clearing house for all news of business significance’ thereby 
relieving investors of the trouble and expenses of seeking to know ‘the many isolated facts underlying the 
operation, management and future prospects of corporations’.8   
Thirdly, the capital market also ‘discounts the future’9 by giving a barometer to gauge the prospective value of 
other properties not listed on the exchange. This aids significantly in determining the economic direction of a 
country. For instance, previous financial crises around the world were mostly preceded by falling stock prices 
giving sufficient clues as to the position of the real economy.10 Fourthly, capital markets exert significant 
influence on the money market often preventing financial panic in the sense that stocks and bonds used as 
collaterals for bank loans could readily be liquidated by the bank without affecting other real businesses. Fifthly, 
capital market allows retail investors to have a long term retirement plans. And finally, governments and 
supranational bodies could easily resort to the market in financing infrastructural development projects.   
Not surprisingly therefore, these functions and advantages combined to make the capital market an efficient 
avenue for smooth investment activities in market economies. It is central to the growth, development and 
                                                          
1
 This was originally supported by the Income Tax Management Act 1961, Trustee Investment Act, 1962, and 
the Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1964. See also the Pension Reform Act, 2004 and the ISA, 2007. 
2
 Ikhide, S.I., op cit., at p. 7. 
3
 See ISA, 2007, s. 315. 
4
  Azfar o., and Matheson, T., Market-Mobilized Capital,  Public Choice, Vol. 117, No. 3/4, Essays in Memory 
of Mancur Olson (Dec., 2003), pp. 357 AT 358-9; Akamiokhor, G. A., ‘Building Capital Market Regulatory 
Institutions in Developing Countries — The Nigerian Experience’, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 45, No. 
2/3, Special Monetary Studies Issue (Capital Markets in Regional Development) (June/September 1996), pp. 
249-278, at p.  251. 
5
 Akamiokhor, G. A., ‘Building Capital Market’, op cit. 
6
 See Bello, M., ‘Clearing the Minefield for Secured Lenders in Nigeria: Pledge of Land as Alternative to 
Mortgage Security in Nigeria’, BUJPL (2011) Vol.4, p. 
7
 Huebner, S.S., Scope and Functions of Stock Market, op cit, at p. 12. 
8
 Ibid.  
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Ibid, noting that ‘a marked rise or decline in the general level of prices is the surest indication, in fact an 
almost unfailing index, of coming prosperity or depression.’ 
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strength of these economies and plays key roles in sustaining the financial system.1 It became popular after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union which saw the ‘triumph’ of capitalism.2 In functional terms, the capital market 
brings so many players together for mutually beneficial purposes.  
By its nature however, the capital market provides some room for financially distasteful and unenviable 
activities making some to describe it as ‘the bottomless pit, worse than all the hells.’3 This necessitated the need 
for regulation so that all players will behave in accordance with acceptable standards of transparency, full 
disclosure and fairness. The objective is to maintain financial stability, sustain confidence in the market and 
protect investors.4 This can be achieved through registration of participants, disclosure and checking market 
infractions. But these regulatory imperatives have encountered serious challenges in a technologically driven 
world with enormous sophistications and constant innovations. In addition, the effects of globalization and 
financial markets integration pose additional challenges to domestic regulators due to cross-border and cross-
asset interactions.5 Foreign stocks are increasingly becoming lucrative targets for investments and the absence of 
foreign investments in a country is seen as a sign of economic stagnation. It is on record that the withdrawal of 
foreign investments from the Nigerian capital markets in 2007 instigated serious market runs and was 
instrumental to the 2007-2011 market crash. This in turn was largely influenced by the global financial crisis 
emanating from the USA.6   
In essence, stringent regulations are necessary in order to ensure fair trading in securities. And since the latter 
has become internationalized, the legal standards are gradually becoming universalized. The International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), for example, has set out three core objectives of modern 
securities regulations to include: protection of investors, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; 
and the reduction of systemic risks.7  In line with these objectives, the ISA, 2007 established the SEC as the apex 
capital market regulator in order ‘to ensure the protection of investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent 
market and reduction of systemic risk’.8 Thus, proper disclosure and transparency are necessary for sustained 
trading on any capital market. In this regard, it has become an almost universal practice to provide in the 
constitution of stock exchanges that the exchange shall provide ‘rooms and other facilities for the convenient 
transaction of business by its members and to maintain high standards of commercial honor and integrity among 
its members, and to promote and inculcate just and equitable principles of trade and business’.9    
Although the Nigerian legal framework on securities trading sought to follow the three key objectives 
recommended by IOSCO, it has not adequately reflected the details of the principles provided therein as we will 
examine later. This contributed to the crisis while shielding some regulators from accountability. 
3 The Regulators and the Collapse of the Capital Market in Nigeria 
Beside the international dimension, the crisis in the Nigerian capital market was largely a product of a colossal 
failure of most (if not all) the stakeholders in the market particularly the regulators. The legislatures found that 
‘there were monumental lapses in regulation.’ 10  Therefore, it is important to identify these regulators and 
examine their responsibilities in the light of the crisis that rocked the capital market. 
3.1 The Regulators of the Capital Market 
                                                          
1
 See International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulations, IOSCO, September, 1998, at p.1. 
2
 See Akamiokhor, G. A., ‘Building’, op cit, at p. 250. 
3
 Heubner, S.S., Scope and Functions, op cit, at p. 7. 
4
 See Ihkide, S.I., ‘Financial Liberalization’, op cit, at p. 18. 
5
 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles, op cit, at p.2. 
6
 House of Representatives’ Ad hoc Committee, Report, op cit. 
7
 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles,  op cit, at para. 4.  
8
 See ISA, 2007, the Preamble.  
9
 See Heubner, S.S., Scope & Functions, op cit., at p. 9. 
10
 House of Reps Ad hoc Committee, Report, op cit, at para 4.4 
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Although there is one principal or apex regulator of the capital markets in Nigeria (the SEC), the events of 2004-
2012 (banking consolidation, astronomical increase in market capitalization of the NSE, corporate collapse and 
eventual crash in the market) have revealed that the SEC is not alone in performing this all important task. 
Therefore, it seems better to present a broader regulatory picture in order to appreciate the statutory roles of these 
regulators. Other ‘regulators’ in this regard include the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigerian 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). Over the years, these bodies have been regulating the activities of other 
non-statutory stakeholders of the market who are the ‘regulated’ or ‘regulatees’. The latter include the 
Stockbrokers, Registrars, Shareholder associations, retail and institutional investors, listed companies and their 
directors. They can be held liable for infractions of market rules or be subjected to the existing legal machineries 
in the country. Thus, the accountability of these private stakeholders is fairly and relatively clear and therefore 
warrants no further discussion in this article.  
It should be pointed out that the NSE started as a statutory body but it is now a private ‘regulator’ as it offers the 
platform for market operators and ‘regulates’ their activities on the NSE. Trading on the NSE requires listing or 
quotation of the securities.1 This is the official admission of securities to the official list of a stock exchange.2 
Only public companies duly registered in Nigeria are qualified for listing on the NSE and the securities must 
have been duly registered by the SEC.3 We now turn to the statutory responsibilities of the key regulators. 
3.1.1 Responsibilities of SEC in Capital Market Regulation 
This body was established first in 1973 as the Capital Issues Commission. It was re-named the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1979 pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Commission Act (SECA) of the 
same year. The Investment and Securities Act, 1999 (ISA) repealed the SECA but retained the SEC with a wider, 
enlarged role.4 The ISA was further amended in 2007 by the Investment and Securities Act. Under this Act, SEC 
is the apex regulatory authority of the capital market and securities transactions in the country.5 It has enacted 
detailed capital market regulations. Unlike the CAC, SEC only deals with public companies and other entities 
entitled by law to transact or trade in securities. Its regulatory functions are therefore, more pervading given the 
increasing relevance and influence of public companies in the country. Section 13 of the ISA, 2007 outlines 
these statutory responsibilities as follows:   
a. regulation of investments and securities business in Nigeria; 
b. registration of securities of public companies and regulation of all offers of securities by public 
companies; 
c. registration and regulation of corporate and individual capital market operators; 
d. protection of investors and maintenance of fair and orderly markets; 
e. protecting the integrity of the securities market against all forms of abuses including insider dealing; 
f. promoting investors' education and the training of all categories of intermediaries in the securities 
industry; 
g. intervening in the management and control of capital market operators which it considers has failed, is 
failing or in crisis including entering into the premises and doing whatsoever the Commission deems 
necessary for the protection of investors; 
                                                          
1
 see s.315 of the ISA which defines "quotation" in relation to securities and in relation to a stock market of a 
securities exchange or capital trade point to include the displaying or providing, on a stock market of a securities 
exchange or capital trade point, information concerning :- (a) prices or considerations; in a case where offers to 
sell, purchase or exchange the securities at particular prices, or for particular consideration, are made or accepted 
on that stock market; (b) offers or invitations; in a case where offers or invitations are made on that stock market, 
being offers or invitations which are intended, or may reasonably be expected, to result, whether directly or 
indirectly, in the making or acceptance of offers to sell, purchase or exchange the securities at particular prices or 
for particular consideration, those prices or that consideration; or (c) in any case, the price at which, or the 
consideration for which, particular persons or particular classes of persons, propose or may reasonably be 
expected to sell, purchase or exchange the securities 
2
 See NSE, The Green Book, p.3. see also s. 31 of the ISA. 
3
 See Rule 311 SEC Rules, 2011. 
4
 ISA, 2007, Explanatory Note. 
5
 Ibid, s. 13. 
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h. preventing fraudulent and unfair trade practices relating to the securities industry; and 
i. Seeking judicial order to freeze the assets (including bank accounts) of any person whose assets were 
derived from the violation of the Act, or any securities law or regulation in Nigeria or other 
jurisdictions.  
The above are some of the regulatory functions of the body. Thus, it monitors operations of capital market 
players and ensure compliance with the ISA and other related regulations governing the securities of public 
companies in Nigeria. As noted above, its roles are more sensitive given the immense influence of public 
companies, the riskiness of their ventures and the increasing stretch of their spheres of operations. It is in this 
light that the ISA, 2007 is seen as a ‘comprehensive’ legislation that gives more teeth to the Commission.1 It has 
a Monitoring and Investigation Department meant to avert manipulative practices, enforce compliance with rules 
and markets ethics and ensure transparency in the operations of the capital market in the country.2 As pointed out 
above, SEC also has a rule-making function.3 In this regard, it has enacted a set of rules and regulations (‘the 
Rules’) directly concerned with investor protection, fair market practices and corporate governance. In 2011, 
these Rules were reviewed and updated.4 Under the Rules, every public company is required to file an annual 
report which must ‘state the level of compliance of the public company with the Code of Corporate Governance 
for Public Companies’.5 In line with IOSCO’s regulatory objective of reducing systemic risk in the capital 
market, the Rules also require all public companies to include risk management as part of their accounting 
policies, disclose any material effect of unmitigated risk on corporate profitability and to disclose strategies for 
preventing risks they are exposed to.6 
In addition, the ISA and the Rules require the registration of all capital market operators and other regulated 
entities.7 For instance, all appointments of directors of capital market operators and establishment of branches 
must be approved by SEC.8 After registration of any operator by SEC, such operator shall also comply with the 
post-registration requirements of membership, inspection, etc.9 Capital market operators are subject to routine 
examination and inspection by the SEC; any failing operator may be taken over by the SEC.10 Interestingly, SEC 
may even revoke the registration of any failing operator, appoint a provisional liquidator and apply to the Federal 
High Court for winding up.11  What is striking however is that this power of SEC either directly conflicts with or 
complements that of the CAC under the CAMA.12 The ISA even adds another ground for winding up outside 
those stipulated under section 408 of the CAMA: revocation of registration of a capital market operator.13 Even 
though the CAMA is a general company law legislation that should give way to a special one (ISA), the fact 
remains that there is an apparent regulatory ‘intersection’ here.   
 
SEC & the Collapse of the Capital Market 
Clearly, the SEC has enormous responsibilities of ensuring a fair and efficient securities trading in the country. 
However, the enormity of its task plus the bureaucracy, regulatory laxity and ‘highhandedness’, corruption and 
the increasing technological challenges facing the capital market in the country appear to have constrained SEC 
in effectively discharging its functions. This is evident in the financial crisis manifested by the collapse or 
distress of publicly traded companies directly under its regulatory jurisdiction in the country. One of the findings 
of the House of Representatives Ad hoc Committee was that ‘there is a complete failure of regulation by the 
                                                          
1
 Paul Usoro & Co, Investments and Securities Act, 2007, PUC Journal, May, 2008 edn., at p.1 
2
 ISA, 2007, s. 
3
 Ibid, s. 313. 
4
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apex securities’ market regulator’.1 In fact, available records have shown that SEC was directly complicit in the 
collapse of the capital market between 2007 and 2011.2 For instance, the SEC was directly implicated in the 
missing 8 Billion Naira arising from a public offer by one bank in 2005;3  SEC allowed unlisted private 
placements in public offers and it was involved in a conflict of interest situation when its DG was coopted into 
the board of AMCON contrary to legal prescription;4 SEC employed staff of one bank when the bank was 
acquiring another bank that had more net worth than the acquirer; apparent market infractions by its ‘regulatees’ 
like the stock brokers (who became the conduits for insider dealings), issuing houses and registrars as revealed 
by the sheer magnitude of share buy-back schemes, with some banks funding their own public offering of 
securities thereby creating bubbles in the market;5 SEC preferred levying fines to compliance with rules by 
market operators; SEC allowed issuance of bonds to refinance old debts by state governments; and it directly 
meddled in the affairs of market operators who were not failing in any way and even effected change in the 
management of the NSE, a company limited by guaranteed, thereby encroaching into the powers of the 
management of the company.6 These are proofs of both regulatory laxity and regulatory highhandedness.  
In spite of all the above problems, the Commission seems to be accountable to no one except perhaps the 
President or his Minister of Finance.7 The Director General and the three Commissioners of SEC are appointed 
by the President upon confirmation by the Senate and removable by him subject to Senate’s approval.8 The Act 
is silent regarding the appointment and removal of the remaining five members of the board, but it can be 
implied that the President has such power of appointment. Beside the requirement of 15 years’ experience in the 
operation of the capital market for the DG and a Bachelor’s degree, no further qualification is required for such 
appointment. Indeed, history has shown that political considerations rather than experience and competence were 
the principal basis for such appointments.9 The inputs of the core market stakeholders such as the self-regulated 
organizations (SROs), stock brokers, under writers, issuing houses and registrars or even the associations of 
these professionals and shareholders or lawyers are not required before the appointment of the board members or 
the DG. In essence, ‘industry checks’ are not available. Therefore, the reality is that one can hardly dissociate 
SEC from the politics of the country in spite of its sensitive regulatory roles in the economy. It is clear that the 
necessary independence of the regulator required by IOSCO’s Principles seems to be lacking here.  
In fact, the ISA, 2007 further compounds the situation by making a provision conferring ‘immunity’ to the 
officers and members of the commission for acts done in ‘good faith’. It provides thus:    
No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any officer, member or other 
employee of the Commission for anything which is done in good faith or intended to be done 
under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder.10 
This seems to impose a liability on the officers or members of the commission for any unlawful or inappropriate 
action where bad faith or lack of good faith can be established. It certainly has its purposes but it is hardly 
designed to entrench accountability. In fact, it can be argued that it may undermine regulatory accountability. 
The SEC as a corporate body can of course be sued11 but the above provision would seem to have indirectly 
diluted the efficacy of this accountability route because in functional terms, the commission acts through its 
staff, officers and members who are covered from legal proceedings. 
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Apart from the above ‘immunity’ provision, the independence of SEC from political interference is limited by 
(1) the overwhelming powers of the Minister under ISA and (2) its financial dependence on the Federal 
Government which has the implication of creating a moral hazard.1 The Act strangely provides that ‘the Minister 
may give to the Commission such directives as appear to him to be just and proper for the effective discharge of 
the functions of the Commission under this Act and it shall be the duty of the Commission to comply’.2 As will 
be discussed hereunder, this clearly subjects SEC to an unhealthy political control thereby undermining its 
independence as the apex regulator of the capital market in the country. 
3.1.2 The Responsibilities of the CAC in Capital Market Regulation 
The CAC is central to the activities of corporate capital market participants in Nigeria. One of the major 
innovations of the CAMA, 1990 is the establishment of the CAC for the registration and statutory administration 
of companies in the country. Prior to 1990, these functions were vested on the Companies Registry under two 
different government Ministries, i.e., the Federal Ministries of Trade and Justice.3 The CAMA is explicit on the 
key regulatory functions of the CAC which include: 
a. to administer the Act including the regulation and supervision of the formation, incorporation, 
registration, management and winding up of companies; 
b. to arrange or conduct an investigation into the affairs of any company where the interest of the 
shareholders and the public so demand; 
c. to perform such other functions as may be specified by any other Act and carry such activities that are 
necessary for giving effect to the provisions of the CAMA.4  
It is pursuant to this and other provisions of the CAMA that the CAC registers and regulates companies and 
supervises dissolution of all companies in Nigeria. In the same vein, the commission constantly monitors the 
financial health or status of all companies by requesting for and receiving and examining their annual returns, 
financial statements and other statutory reports.5 It approves and monitors any change in the management of any 
company; it may also make enquiries on any person or company regarding compliance with the CAMA.6 
Thus, the CAC registers and regulates corporate capital market operators or participants and provides the basis 
for any subsequent industry-based regulation of corporate entities in the country. In other words, it is the first 
point of contact or regulatory authority for persons desirous of forming a public company or converting a private 
company into public and vice versa. Before any public company issues its securities for trading purposes or even 
assume its legal status as such, it must be duly registered by the CAC as a corporate entity first. Thereafter, the 
company must file returns and comply with all the provisions of the CAMA. 
The CAC & the Collapse of the Capital Market 
The CAC is obviously indispensable to the capital market operations in the country. But like the SEC, the CAC 
has become under serious scrutiny lately following the capital market crash in 2007-2011 as so much regulatory 
failures emerged. Apart from bureaucratic bottlenecks, the CAC seems technologically ill-equipped to deal with 
many challenges brought by the sophistication of modern businesses as a consequence of globalization. In 
addition, the Report of the Ad hoc Committee also made damning findings on the registration by CAC of bogus 
companies that were used to facilitate the ‘nationalization’ of some companies whose stocks were listed on the 
NSE but simply disappeared thereafter.7 For instance, between Friday 5th August 2011 and Monday, 8th August, 
2011, the names, shareholding structures, membership and board structures of three banks were completely 
changed and ‘there were evidence to suggest fraud, misrepresentations, and forgeries’.8 From public companies 
the banks suddenly became private companies with two private shareholders each.9 Companies were dissolved 
                                                          
1
 Ibid, s. 19. 
2
 ISA, 2007, s. 298. Italics for emphasize. 
3
 See Orojo, O.J., Company Law and Practice in Nigeria (Durban: Lexis Nexis, 2008) at p.23; Nigerian Law Reform 
Commission, Report on Company Law Reform in Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 
1992); & Dominic, A., & Olong M., The Corporate Investigative Powers of the Corporate Affairs Commission in the 
Promotion of Corporate Governance’, available at http://www.dspace.unijos.edu.ng.  
4
 CAMA, 1990, s.7. 
5
 Ibid, ss. 370-372. 
6
 Ibid., s.563. 
7
 House of Reps Ad hoc Committee, Report, op cit, at para. 4. 2, pp. 41-47. 
8
 Ibid, at para.4.2, p. 42 
9
 Ibid, at pp.42-47. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.40, 2015 
 
176 
by other regulators (e.g. CBN and the NDIC) without regard to the provisions of the CAMA or coordinating with 
the CAC and the latter failed in its functions by its passivity or simply looking the other way or being complicit 
to this regulatory fiasco. 
Like the SEC, the question of accountability of the CAC and its officers has not received much attention even 
after the crisis in the capital market. But it is worth noting that apart from being a corporate body suable for any 
action or inaction, there is no provision for any ‘immunity’ to its officers or members like the one under section 
302 of the ISA, 2007 with respect to SEC officers and members. In addition, unlike the provisions of the ISA in 
respect of the composition and appointment of board members of SEC, the CAMA entrenches an ‘industry 
check’ on the composition of the CAC by requiring the appointment of a chairman who shall be a person with 
‘ability, experience or specialized knowledge of corporate, industrial, commercial, financial or economic matters 
or of business or professional attainments’1 as well as members representing the business community from the 
Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture; the accountancy profession; 
and the legal profession.2 The Registrar General who is the Chief Executive shall be appointed and may be 
sacked by the commission with the approval of the President and must be a legal practitioner with at least 10 
years’ experience in company law and practice.3 The Act is silent on the appointing authority of other members 
but it can be implied that the Commission (with the approval of the President) is the appointer.   
3.1.3 The Responsibilities of Central Bank of Nigeria in Capital Market Regulation 
The banking sub-sector dominates the capital market and accounts for over 70% of activities on the NSE.4 
Therefore, as the apex regulatory body of this sub-sector, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is an important 
body that is at the fore-front of financial sector regulation in Nigeria. Unlike the above two regulators, the CBN 
is industry-specific with regard to the capital market. Historically, its establishment in 1958 ended the ‘free-
banking’ period in the country which was characterized by supervisory vacuum.5 Obviously, the sensitivity of 
the banking business makes prudential regulation and supervision imperative. Both the CBN Act and the BOFIA 
provide the general regulatory and supervisory roles of the CBN. These include requirements as to the 
establishment of banks (granting and revocation of license),6  keeping and filing of returns by banks, 7  and 
ensuring that banks maintain minimum capital ratio and a reserve fund to ensure constant liquidity. 8  An 
important aspect of the supervisory role of the CBN is the routine examination of banks and its controlling 
powers over ‘failing’ and undercapitalized banks.9 It further collaborates with the NDIC for implementing 
specific distress resolution measures for such banks.10 Furthermore, the CBN may issue guidelines to institutions 
under its supervision.11 In 2003, the Bankers’ Committee produced a Code of Corporate Governance for Banks 
12
 which was reviewed following the 2004-2005 recapitalization and consolidation exercise in the sector. This 
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became necessary in order to address post-consolidation challenges such as the passivity of shareholders, board 
room squabbles, technical incompetence, poor risk management systems, insider abuses, fraudulent and self-
serving practices, etc.1  
The CBN was instrumental in setting up the AMCON to acquire the non-performing loans and toxic assets of the 
banks in the country.2 The CBN and the FMF constitute the two shareholders of both AMCON3 and NDIC.4 The 
latter was established to provide insurance to depositors of deposit money banks in the country5 while the former 
is directly controlled by the CBN on behalf of the Federal Government.6  
The CBN & the Collapse of the Capital Market 
The CBN has been at the center of all major economic reforms in the past two decades in the country. It initiated 
and propelled series of banking reforms notable of which were the 2004-2005 consolidation in the banking 
sector and the 2010-2014 corporate governance reforms both of which significantly impacted on the national 
economy. It was revealed that over 400 Billion Naira was raised as a result of the forced recapitalization of the 
banks.7 Today the banking sector has been strengthened because of these reforms. However, notwithstanding the 
positive effects of these reforms to the economy, many legal questions have been raised about their propriety.8 
The CBN has over the years become a ‘meta-state’ that is increasingly becoming unaccountable and pursuing its 
reform measures by forcing itself upon other regulatory agencies while disregarding the legal boundaries 
constructed by statutes. This was evident first in the recapitalization of commercial banks which set in the forced 
consolidation exercise in 2004.9 The CBN issued a Guideline on mergers and acquisition10 which are hugely 
risky business combination mechanisms ordinarily falling within the regulatory province of SEC.11 Critics of 
consolidation view it as the CBN prioritizing banking supervision over monetary stability while forcing odd 
entities to merge because of regulatory pressure.12 Ogowewo and Uche argue that:  
               Mergers and acquisitions are in the best of circumstances - when they are entered into because of 
the identification of a strategic business objective - fraught with many difficulties. Where the 
strategic objective is regulatory pressure, the odds against successful consolidations increase. By 
"forcing" banks to approach mergers with an eye to achieving a balance sheet consolidation, 
rather than on the synergies to be created, the Central Bank has increased the risk that ill-fitting 
entities may have consolidated their balance sheets. Consolidated entities that end up destroying 
shareholder value can hardly be regarded as successful merger.13 
In hindsight, the critics were vindicated because the CBN itself admitted that the consolidation exercise was a 
hoax and the CBN had woefully failed in its regulatory functions in this regard: governance and internal 
processes were unstructured and the CBN did not provide input to the SEC in planning its examinations of 
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banks.1 The former Governor of the CBN pointed out that the CBN’s ‘Board agendas were set by the Governor 
and consequently reflected his priorities, and there were inadequate committee structures and processes to ensure 
the CBN Board’s independence in assessing whether the CBN was fulfilling its mission’.2 In addition, the former 
Governor observed that ‘no one was held accountable for addressing the key industry issues such as risk 
management, corporate governance, fraud, money laundering, cross-regulatory co-ordination, enforcement, legal 
prosecution or for ensuring examination policies and procedures were well adapted to the prevailing 
environment’.3 
In the same vein, the investigation of the Legislatures found that the N25 billion capital requirement for banks in 
Nigeria laid the very foundation for capital bubbles that were to haunt the financial sector for a very long time4 
and concluded that the ‘successes’ of the consolidation exercise were ‘cooked’ as it was ‘largely ego-driven, and 
merely an attempt to control, rather than to supervise or regulate the banking system.’5  The exercise led to 
indiscriminate margin loans, ‘crystallized underwriting of new public issues; direct speculative activities by 
banks through their subsidiaries; direct/indirect purchase of own shares (treasury stocks) by banks; boom in 
primary market and a sucking dry of secondary market as investors dumped their shares in the secondary market 
in favor of the primary market.’6  
In 2010, the CBN tried to rescue the banking subsector by injecting over 600 Billion Naira into some illiquid 
banks following the crash in the capital market and the ‘nationalization’ of failing banks but refused to disclose 
results of special examination to anybody thereby raising concerns about the transparency of the entire process.7 
This bail-out measure proved to be effective but there was no any budgetary process or parliamentary approval 
for that contrary to the global practice.8 In addition, it is evident that the CBN has an over-bearing influence over 
other regulators. For instance, the ‘nationalized’ banks were simply converted into private limited liability 
companies while their stocks were not delisted from the NSE thereby implying complicity on the part of both the 
SEC and CAC as indicated above.9 The NDIC is also directly controlled by the CBN as evidenced by the 
adoption of the bridged bank failure resolution option in the case of the failed banks.10 The AMCON, described 
as a ‘time-bomb’11 and directly regulated and controlled by the CBN for all purposes, had also co-opted the DG 
of SEC into its Board.12 It has been observed that the direct control of AMCON by the CBN made both 
regulators unaccountable as ‘it is a case of one regulating oneself’.13 The members of the Board of CBN and the 
Governor are to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the senate. Beside the political 
accountability mechanism which is often abused, the CBN cannot be held to account for its regulatory failures 
and this is really troubling for efficient and capital market operation in the country.  
3.1.4 The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
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The NSE is a securities exchange recognized by the ISA as one of the platforms for trading in securities issued 
by companies and governments. 1  As noted above, Stock Exchanges have traditionally exercised oversight 
function regarding listing, enforcing disclosure standards, maintenance of fair, transparent market and 
monitoring compliance with market standards.2 Since 1960, the Nigerian Stock Exchange has developed into the 
‘pinot of the Nigerian capital market’3 providing a crucial avenue for raising capital and channeling accumulated 
wealth for investment purposes. In reality, the consolidation exercise in Nigeria’s banking sector was made 
possible through this Exchange. The official recapitalization of the banks forced them to offer their stocks to the 
public thereby increasing the number of their shareholders and significantly diluting or dispersing the equity 
ownership structures of these banks. The NSE is a self-regulatory organization (SRO) under the jurisdictional 
control of the SEC. In terms of regulation of the capital market, it ‘complements’ the role of SEC because it is 
not a statutory body but a company sui generis. It is a body that is empowered to ‘call for information from, 
inspect and conduct inquiries and audit of its members’.4 As noted above, the NSE also enacted Listing Rules 
that require listed companies to submit ‘quarterly, half-yearly and annual accounts’.5 The Listing requirements 
primarily aimed at ensuring fair and transparent market, promoting general market efficiency, creating and 
maintaining trust and protecting the investing public from the inherent risks and fluidity of the market. 6  
Importantly, the regulatory functions of the NSE, like other securities exchanges, are essentially meant to 
provide a conducive atmosphere for trading in securities. Transparency and fair market operations are therefore 
central. Accordingly, the SEC Rules require the disclosure of material and price sensitive information that are 
likely to affect financial conditions to the securities exchange.7 For instance, the Rules provide that: 
All information likely to affect the financial condition of a company shall be made available to the 
Securities Exchange by the company and the Securities Exchange shall disclose it on the trading floor 
immediately the information is made available.8 
The NSE & the Collapse of the Capital Market 
The NSE is the prominent capital market in Nigeria and has played an unparalleled role in the development of 
Nigeria’s securities trading system over the years. It was the crash of stocks in this Exchange that affected the 
entire economy for over three years.9 Thus, it was the ‘field’ in which the regulatory failures of the above bodies 
manifested themselves into a catastrophic market crash. The fact that market infractions went undetected or 
ignored by the NSE management is enough to impeach its credibility as an effective SRO. Like these regulators, 
the NSE failed to exercise its regulatory powers over its members. Available evidence shows that most Council 
members and the head of the NSE were stockbrokers and the stockbrokers were found to be the actual 
perpetrators of insider dealings in the market.10 It failed to live up to its responsibility of registering brokers and 
renewing their licenses and its management was indicted for corrupt practices.11  Of course the SEC removed the 
management of NSE in a questionable manner but the reality is that the NSE did not provide the requisite 
platform that will guarantee transparent and fair market dealings. 
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4. Regulatory Accountability in Nigeria’s Capital Market  
From the above, it may be safely concluded that the regulators directly and indirectly caused the 2007-2011 
crises in the capital market due largely to a combination of both regulatory laxity and regulatory highhandedness 
thereby causing regulatory breaches and lack of coordination which eventually undermined investors’ 
confidence in the market. As noted earlier, the normal investigations and criminal trials were launched but 
should these be the ultimate end and will they even satisfy the quest for regulatory accountability? It will be 
noticed that one recurring problem in this market crisis has been the lack of accountability of nearly all the 
regulatory players involved even in the face of enormous statutory responsibilities and powers conferred on 
them. The questions here are: what manner of accountability can address regulatory laxity and regulatory 
highhandedness for an effective capital market operation in the country?  Is removing heads of organizations for 
failure and making them to stand trial not enough for the purpose of accountability? Can there be regulatory 
accountability or can regulators qua regulators be held accountable for regulatory failures to prevent future 
market crash? Can, for instance, the CBN and SEC be held liable for the systemic crash in the capital market and 
by whom? It may seem implausible to talk of regulating regulators but it is submitted that it is elementary 
jurisprudence that the law will fail in its functions if it does not regulate regulators. Thus, there is regulatory 
accountability for failures beyond the mere traditional measures of criminal trials, investigations and sacking of 
heads of organizations. Perhaps, that is why constitutional constraints are necessarily imposed on regulatory 
institutions.1 
4.1 Accountability in Context 
It is important to understand accountability as a concept. It is sometimes treated as a synonym of liability or 
culpability. In this context, accountability simply entails a legal entity answering for its actions or inactions with 
a view to maintaining integrity as well as creating and sustaining confidence in the capital market. According to 
the IOSCO accountability implies that a regulator operates independent of sectoral interests with a sufficiently 
defined system of public accountability that permits judicial review of decisions of the regulator.2 This is a 
plausible approach but it seems to have centered on the judicial process. While advocating for a robust 
performance evaluation accountability mechanism for regulators, Scott conceived accountability as ‘a 
relationship in which the organization being held to account has an obligation to explain its activities to another 
organization that may pose questions, make judgments, and (possibly) deliver consequences for failings.’3 The 
key determinant is the regulator’s compliance with rules and procedures.4 Accountability can occur at three 
levels which may be employed simultaneously: upwards (to the courts, legislature, and ministers), horizontally 
(to other agencies such as ombudsman, audit institutions, and information regulators), and downwards (to 
‘regulatees’ or intended beneficiaries of the regime like all the market participants in the context of capital 
market).5 Within these three levels both the criminal and civil liability measures could be discerned. In the UK, 
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Independent Regulators’, in OECD, Designing, op cit, at p.101; Majone, G., Strategy and Structure the Political 
Economy of Agency Independence and Accountability, in OECD, Designing, op cit,  at; Nicolaedes, P., 
Regulation of Liberalised Markets: A New Role for the State? (or How to Induce Competition Among 
Regulators?), in OECD, Designing, op cit, at p. 156; Moore, M.C., ‘Maintaining Efficient and Effective 
Relations Between Regulatory Authorities’, in OECD, Designing, op cit, at p. 172; Frison-Roche, M., ‘The Role 
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the FSMA, 2000 1  instituted parliamentary accountability, stakeholder accountability, corporate governance 
accountability mechanisms, and holding the regulator accountable through the courts and independent complaint 
scheme.2 
In Nigeria, some executives of the companies and other market participants involved in the market infractions 
were already subjected to criminal trials and were sentenced accordingly3 while others are still standing trials. 
However, individual criminal liability is unsuitable to securities regulation. This is partly because the 
constitutional constrains regarding fair trial, burden and standards of proof makes criminal liability practically 
inefficient, ineffective and disadvantageous to the sustainability of the capital markets.4 Second, the territorial 
reach of criminal jurisdictions constrains the efficacy of penal sanctions particularly in the light of the increasing 
internationalization and integration of capital markets around the world. Thirdly, market infractions and breach 
of securities regulations are relatively less morally reprehensible vis-à-vis other crimes and ‘since criminal 
offences compete for scarce police resources with other, seemingly more serious, crimes’, breaches of securities 
laws are unlikely be given any priority.5  Thus, civil and what some called ‘regulatory’6 liability seem better for 
the creation and sustenance of confidence in the capital market.   
4.2 Holding Regulators Accountable for Regulatory Failures in the Capital Market: Some Proposals  
All the above regulators are corporate bodies with capacity to sue and be sued.7 In spite of this capacity, very 
few cases were instituted in order to hold them accountable for some of the regulatory failures highlighted. And 
none of the heads of these bodies who misdirected them with poor judgement was charged with any offence 
despite overwhelming evidence of crimes being committed. Perhaps identifying the proper claimants plus the 
immunity from prosecution might pose some challenges. Regardless however, the regulators may be held 
accountable either under public law actions for judicial review or private claims in tort.8 In the light of the 
challenges in our judicial system, we further propose the development of another relatively efficient regulatory 
accountability mechanism in the form of either a new restructured SEC or a supreme regulator of the capital 
market. We now expound these three accountability channels separately. 
1. Actions for Judicial Review 
Any decision of the regulator that is ultra vires or otherwise questionable on account of legal propriety could 
ground action for judicial review. 9  Some cases were instituted against some of the regulators notably by 
shareholder activists but most of the cases were terminated on technical grounds.10 Given the sensitivity of the 
capital markets to the economy, a cautious approach needs to be adopted by the courts and care should be taken 
not to ‘second guess’ the professional decisions of the regulators so as not to ground or disrupt the markets. 
Thus, only meritorious cases should be entertained by the courts.11 In an action against an SRO in the UK, Lord 
Bingham held thus: 
It seems to me quite plain that [SROs] are bodies over whom the court can, in appropriate 
circumstances, and will, exercise supervisory jurisdiction, but recognition of that jurisdiction must 
in my judgement be combined with a recognition that the clear intention of the Act is that ... these 
bodies ... are, in anything other than very clear circumstances, to be left to get on with it.12     
                                                          
1
 See FSMA, 2000, ss. 2-11, sched 1 paras. 3-4, 8-12.  
2
 See E. Lomnicka, ‘Making the Financial Services Authority accountable’, [2000] J.B.L. 65. 
3
  
4
 Lomnicka, E., ‘Capital Markets Regulation in Nigeria and the UK: The Role of the Courts Journal of African 
Law, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2002), pp. 155-166, at p. 159. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid, at p. 
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 See ISA, 2007, s.; CAMA, 1990, s.; CBN Act, 2007, s. . 
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 Lomnicka, E., ‘Capital Markets Regulation in Nigeria and the UK, op cit, at p.163 
9
 Nwabueze, B., Constitutional Democracy in Africa (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, ) 
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 See R v. Panel on Take-overas and Mergers ex p Datafin [1987] 2 W.L.R. 699; [1987] 1 All E.R. 564 (CA); R 
v. SIB exp Sun Life Assurance plc [1996] 2 B.C.L.C. 150; R v. SIB exp IFAA [1995] 2 B.C.L.C. 76 (CA). 
12
 R v. The Securities and Futures Association e x p Paton (CA) (20 June 1994), [1995] J.B.L. 595 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.40, 2015 
 
182 
However, it should be pointed out that judicial scrutiny of capital market regulators and participants in Nigeria 
should be stricter than in the UK in the light of the former’s level of development in securities law and practice. 
This, it is submitted, would enhance the integrity of the system and consolidate the development of the market.   
2. Actions in Tort 
This may be employed against the regulators in three main situations as follows: 
a. Regulatory Negligence 
The regulated or ‘regulatees’ and even members of the public affected by capital market meltdown may institute 
actions against any regulator qua regulator that is found to be guilty of negligence in the performance of its 
duty.1 Thus, in the light of the facts presented above the SEC, CBN, CAC and NSE all could be held liable on 
the ground of regulatory negligence that caused the capital market to crash regard being had to the statutory 
period of limitation of course, immunity on grounds of good faith and other statutory constraints. However, as in 
most cases of negligence, the major challenge here is how to establish a duty of care in favor of the regulated or 
the members of the public who alleged regulatory negligence.2 Another likely challenge in this context is that of 
locus standi.3 
b. Breach of Statutory Duty  
The regulated or ‘regulatees’ may hold any regulator accountable for a breach of statutory duty under the law of 
tort. This cause of action arises where a statutory body committed or caused to be committed a wrong in 
apparent disregard of its statutory duties thereby harming the claimant.4 This can be employed to hold capital 
market regulators accountable for both regulatory laxity and regulatory highhandedness that contravened their 
statutory powers and caused harm to capital market participants. There is no decided case on this head of claim 
against regulators in Nigeria. In the English case of Melton Medes Ltd v. SIB5 the Securities and Investment 
Board disclosed information received as a regulator of the claimant to help investors sue the claimant and the 
latter instituted action claiming that the action of the regulator amounted to both a breach of statutory duty and a 
breach of confidence. And it was held a regulator can be held liable on account of its violation of its statutory 
duty to the regulated.  
c. Misfeasance in Public Office 
‘Misfeasance’ means transgression or performing a lawful action in a wrongful manner.6 It is a tort of excessive, 
malicious or negligent exercise of statutory powers by a public officer.7 Thus, it perfectly fits into our notion of 
‘regulatory highhandedness’. Misfeasance is a novel but ‘promising’8 cause of action that has also not yet been 
tested against the regulators in Nigeria. In fact, even in other common law jurisdictions it is still evolving in the 
area of regulatory accountability. In the English case of Three Rivers D.C. V. Bank of England (No. 3)9 
following the collapse of BCCI, depositors brought an action against the Bank of England (the equivalent of our 
CBN) as the regulator of the collapsed bank and it was held that regulators can be sued for misfeasance in public 
office. Thus, capital market stakeholders aggrieved by any excessive use of powers by the CBN or SEC as 
established immediately after the crisis can initiate action under this head. This will certainly entrench regulatory 
accountability in the sector. 
3. A New SEC or a Supreme Regulator    
With politics and massive corruption in the country generally and in the financial services sector in particular, 
relying on the above legal ‘channels’ to hold capital market regulators accountable may seem hugely daunting 
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175;[ 1987]3 W.L.R.7 76; [1987]2 All E.R. 704; Minories Finance Ltd v. Arthur Young [1989] 2 All E.R. 105; 
[1988] F.L.R. 345; Davies v. Radcliffe [1990] 2 All E.R. 536 (PC) 
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 See V. President of Nigeria 
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 Winfred and Jolowitz on Tort, op cit, at p. 
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 [1995]3 All E.R. 880. 
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 See Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edn. at p. 1015 
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 See Lomnicka, E., ‘Capital Markets Regulation in Nigeria and the UK, op cit, at p.164. 
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and problematic for obvious reasons. Most criminal trials are individualistic in nature and are ill-suited to the 
securities market as argued above. And corporate criminal responsibility is similarly problematic particularly in 
the context of the Nigerian criminal justice system.1 In addition, the independence of these regulators is seriously 
doubtful in the light of the events that unfolded in the financial services sector in the past decade. The frequent 
sacking and reconstitution of the Boards of the regulators which are mostly populated by political cronies are 
unhealthy for a smooth development of the capital market in the country. Needless to stress the elementary point 
that regulators may be sued by private persons or capital market participants or stakeholders who felt aggrieved 
by their actions or inactions. Indeed, following the financial crisis several actions were filed by some activist 
stakeholders challenging regulatory highhandedness in the capital market.2 However, these are normal legal 
actions that must follow the normal judicial processes in the country. And it is unarguable that even with the 
Investments and Securities Tribunal (IST) as a special tribunal established to ease and facilitate speedy 
adjudication of disputes in the capital market,3 the judicial system in Nigeria is protractedly unreliable as it is far 
from being sound, effective and efficient. One should not expect investors and participants in securities 
transactions in the capital markets to put up with a sluggish, inefficient judicial machinery. In addition, 
coordinating the regulatory players is difficult. The Financial Services Regulatory Coordinating Committee is 
biased towards the banking and other financial institutions and its legal status is unclear. Besides, the FSRCC is 
dominated and controlled by the CBN which has succeeded in making itself the ‘unaccountable oligarch’ in the 
sector and is therefore, unreliable in our quest for an effective and proper regulatory accountability in the sector. 
Finally, the past decade has shown that the SEC is not truly and in functional terms the actual apex regulator of 
the capital market even as the ISA proclaimed it to be so. In functional terms, the CBN, AMCON and CAC seem 
to treat it as a peer (perhaps subservient in the case of the CBN) regulator.  
Therefore, it seems plausible for the purpose of regulatory accountability to consider two options: to either 
restructure, recreate the SEC and conferred it with more operational independence or establish another 
institutional layer on the regulatory ladder so that all the existing players will be subject to its jurisdiction in 
terms of securities transactions on any regulated exchange in the country. It may be argued that the latter option 
will amount to an unnecessary duplication of function. But if we truly want regulatory accountability then it may 
not be a duplication at all. In either case true independence is critically important. This is because independence 
of the regulator is necessary in order to shield it from political interference as happened before, during and after 
the recent crisis in the capital market in Nigeria. In fact, the first regulatory principle recommended by IOSCO is 
that ‘the regulator should be operationally independent and accountable in the exercise of its functions and 
powers’ and it should ‘adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes’.4 Interestingly, governments’ bonds are 
commonly traded on the capital market. Therefore, the regulator ought to be insulated from any form of political 
or commercial interference. It is recognized that government involvement in securities regulation is necessary at 
some point but the circumstances ‘should be clear and the process sufficiently transparent or subject to review to 
safeguard its integrity’. 5  Appointing politicians will promote short-termism while undermining regulatory 
independence.6 
In the UK for instance, the Financial Service Authority (FSA) is uniquely positioned with operational 
independence to enable it regulate the capital market without political interference.7  The FSA is a company 
limited by guarantee but has been conferred with statutory powers.8 Unlike the Nigerian SEC, it is a self-
financing body independent from the Government except in the following limited circumstances: appointment of 
board, directive to alter Rules following report of the Competition Commission, directive to FSA to comply with 
UK’s international obligations and initiating inquiries in cases of serious regulatory failure.9 In addition, the FSA 
is subject to judicial control and has overall regulatory jurisdiction on other ‘secondary’ capital market 
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regulators. Therefore, unlike the Nigerian SEC, the FSA has true operational independence required by the 
IOSCO’s standards for regulator’s independence and accountability as examined above.  
5 Conclusion  
Capital markets are too important to allow regulatory laxity or regulatory highhandedness to overrun them. From 
the above analysis, there is no doubt that the apex regulator in Nigeria  needs to be overhauled and restructured 
to make it more genuinely independent in performing its functions. More importantly, history may repeat itself 
in the absence of genuine regulatory accountability in the capital market. It is recommended that both the 
primary and secondary regulators of the capital markets need to be held accountable for regulatory laxity, 
highhandedness, apparently illegal and misdirected decisions and negligence. This must go beyond mere 
parliamentary inquiries and selective, individual criminal prosecutions. Responsibilities must go with 
accountability. While all the regulators have defined responsibilities, it is submitted that responsibilities without 
matched accountability will end up being sure recipes for systemic financial crisis and collapse of the capital 
market in the country. Both public accountability principles of judicial review of administrative actions and 
private actions in torts of regulatory negligence, breach of statutory duty and regulatory misfeasance could be 
invoked to hold regulators accountable. In essence, their actions must be within the bounds of the law. 
Shareholders and all the other key stakeholders must rise to the occasion. This is because lack of regulatory 
accountability could lead to frequent reoccurrence of avoidable capital market crisis. The cross border effects of 
market collapse in Nigeria must be recognized. And with the position of the country as the largest economy in 
Africa, the domino effects of this to the global economy can only be imagined.   
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